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Carlos d o s a
Introduction1
The notion of a social contract has been central to concepts of citizenship both 
in political theory and constitutional practice. Citizenship has been perceived as 
inclusive of social rights for guaranteeing individuals’ autonomy and self- 
realization as human beings. The neo-liberal assault on the welfare state has 
questioned this view but, as a reaction, it has also stimulated the search for new 
ways of reconstructing the classical notion of citizenship. In this context, 
European Union citizenship appears very appealing. Three developments have 
fuelled expectations: the severing of the link between rights and nationality 
within the EU; the development of certain EU social rights and, finally, the 
recreation of citizenship at the EU level. The linkage of the concept of EU 
citizenship to the idea of a social contract is thus gaining currency in 
Europarlance, although at the expense of conceptual clarity: for ‘social contract’ 
refers both to the classical imperative of legitimising public power with EU 
citizens’ consent (Neunreither 1995), as well as to an understanding of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) as a pact among individuals as well as states 
(Weiler 1995: 22). >
This paper does not aim to produce a new conception of social pact; rather, it 
presents a sceptical view of the prospects of using EU citizenship as an 
instrument for rebuilding the old social contract and, specifically, its welfare 
dimension. But this scepticism should not be interpreted as a negation of the 
possibility of, or, even less, the desirability of such development. The link 
between citizenship and contractualism is refened to in the first section in 
summary fashion. The contents and limits of EU citizenship are established in 
section two in order to show, in section three, that EU citizenship has been 
mainly developed through negative integration and that this facilitates a liberal- 
inspired form of social contract. As a result, it is argued in section four, the 
prospects for developing EU social rights are slim. However, it is also argued 
that EU citizenship must be central to any redefinition of a social contract in 
Europe.
The aim of this study is not to compare EU citizenship with an ideal type drawn 
from national citizenships. Rather, its conception of F.LJ citizenship is grounded 
in the context of current EU legal and political practice, identifying concrete and 
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Contractualist Doctrines and the Boundaries of Citizenship
The idea of a social contract is part of the notion of citizenship itself. The first 
theoretical expression of contractualism, the Hobbesian one, referred to a basic 
social contract in which individuals were held equal as subjects (Baubock 1994). 
This conveys an implicit idea of weak citizenship but there is a more important 
characteristic: the individuals who participate in this social contract play no part 
in defining it. The contract does not imply a redefinition of the group (although 
this question is not explicitly addressed in a theoretical way) and is therefore 
premised on the pre-existence of a community as the basis for consensual 
change. Later models of the social contract built upon this pattern of a basic pact 
to make it dependent on guarantees of fundamental civic rights (Locke) or on 
the individual’s self-realization through political participation by exercising 
political rights (Rousseau). The modem understanding of contractualism, as 
reflected in constitutional practice, has extended the pact to include a wider 
guarantee of social rights, based on the belief (in parallel to economic 
keynesianism) that the self-realization of a member of the community contributes 
to the improvement of the community as a whole.
Certainly, it could be objected that the latter evolution reflects a rather 
communitarian understanding of the social contract and that liberal versions of 
the social contract, theoretically rooted in Locke, differ substantially from this. 
In the liberal tradition, negative freedoms are predominant and the participation 
in the public sphere is not an instrument for individual self-realisation. 
However, a possible similarity between both models can be identified: the 
absence of theoretical inquiry into the boundaries of the contracting group. 
Regardless of their liberal or communitarian inspiration, all forms of citizenship 
relied on the existence of a pre-defined human of group on which the pact is 
predicated, and, simultaneously, on a bounded and defined public space in which 
the status of citizenship is guaranteed. This explains why some authors consider 
that liberal citizenship theories are implicitly communitarian (Bellamy 1994).
Obviously the factor that has altered current perceptions of citizenship - mass 
migration - was not an issue when these theoretical models were developed. In 
practical terms, nation-states served to define these boundaries, both in a 
communitarian as much as a liberal perspective. It is not just that the nation-state 
provided the framework for free individual and collective action; but also that 
the new political role of individuals demanded a deeper degree of personal 
commitment, even to the point of self-sacrifice and, at this juncture, nationalism 
served to foster people’s identification with this role: nationalism and 




























































































Carlos d o sa
one’s country, a transcendent entity which took the place of personal allegiance 
to the sovereign. As Habermas argues, there was a symbiosis between 
nationalism and republicanism in this respect (Habermas 1994: 23). The social 
contract was not unlimited; citizenship was established within bounded and 
defined communities, and this automatically created a criterion for exclusion. 
Exclusion was based on the understanding of the State as an entity whose telos 
is to express the will and further the interests of distinctive and bounded nations, 
and whose legitimacy depends on their doing so, or at least appearing to do so 
(Brubaker 1992: 28). Nationality became the essential attribute for determining 
an individual’s entitlement to citizenship rights.
This theoretical reasoning does not lead to an automatic deduction of a practical 
distinction between the status of citizens and aliens. It is true that constitutional 
texts, independent of their liberal or communitarian inspiration, and beginning 
with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, establish a difference 
between human rights (granted to everybody within the territory of a state) and 
citizenship rights (reserved only for certain individuals). But it is also true that 
State practice through the progressive granting of civil, social and even political 
rights to formerly excluded individuals or groups has steadily eroded the 
juridical and conceptual distinction between citizens and non-citizens within 
most Western states. The distinction has been kept only at a conceptual level and 
regarding certain limited rights: fundamental rights (whatever their content) are 
granted in general on an equal footing to citizens and non-citizens alike 
(Hammar 1990: 83). Accordingly, some authors have revitalize the Lockean 
concept of "denizen", which means a lawfully resident alien with the same 
primary rights of political participation as native or naturalized citizens (Layton- 
Henry 1990; Meehan 1993: 18), while "metic" would be a resident alien with 
legal status but enjoying only a limited number of the rights of citizenship.
This severing of the link between citizenship and nationality has required a 
redefinition of communitarian perspectives on citizenship, since from a purely 
liberal standpoint it is not, a priori, conceptually problematic to give aliens 
citizenship status. Communitarian views have also evolved to encompass the 
increasing permeability and inclusiveness of the respective communities as part 
of their own self-identity. Identity is not only basecl on historical continuity but 
is also constructed through an understanding of the morally acceptable current 
status of other individuals within the community. The horrors of nazism and 
totalitarianism and the various forms of dictatorship world-wide have led to a 
reformulation of the ways in which democratic communities define themselves: 
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constitution of a democratic community. Thus, an extensive granting of rights 
to non-citizens has become regular practice in western states.
To recapitulate, social contract doctrines inspired the creation of status of rights 
guaranteed within the boundaries of the nation state; these rights were 
progressively enlarged and generalized. The creation of the concept of EU 
citizenship can be understood as part of the process described above: from a 
liberal standpoint, there is no contradiction in granting certain rights (such as the 
right to free movement) to nationals from EU Member States as a precondition 
for the operation of the single market. The acceptance which this redefinition of 
the privileges of national citizenship requires from the communitarian standpoint 
is based on the subordination of EU citizenship rights to respect for national 
identities (Closa 1994), thereby easing anxieties about the dilution of 
communitarian citizenships within the Member States.
Premises and Limits of EU citizenship
Essentially, EU citizenship is a legal status consisting of a set of positive rights - 
freedom of movement and residence, voting rights in local and European 
Parliament (EP) elections, the right of petition to the EP; the right to appeal to 
the ombudsman and the right to diplomatic protection. Most of these are already 
present (albeit in an imperfect way) in EC law, to which some add implicit 
rights and duties. The fundamental characteristic of this status is that it is not an 
alternative to or substitute for national citizenship; but, rather, it adds a second 
layer of new rights enjoyed in any Member State to the first layer of nationality 
rights enjoyed within a Member State (Closa 1992; O’Keefe 1994). At the 
moment, the rights embodied in the notion of citizenship of the Union are 
strictly limited, even though there is provision for their further enlargement. 
This limitation creates a clear distinction from national citizenship: Union 
citizenship is a specific status whose scope is reduced to the effects expressly 
mentioned in the Treaty and, which is therefore, distinct from the more generic 
character of national citizenships (Ruzie 1994: 10). Citizenship of the Union, as 
enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and at its current stage of 
development, is a guarantee for the enjoyment of certain rights regardless of 
which Member State nationality an individual may possess. Moreover, EU 
citizenship reflects an indirect link between an individual and the Union, 
mediated by nationality of a Member State.
Not surprisingly, then, there are clear limits to the legal status created by EU 




























































































Carlos d o s a
individual rights, the development of certain other citizenship rights is made 
more difficult by the absence of a community at the EU level that is equivalent, 
for the citizen, to the nation-state. Political participation in national elections is 
the example of this: their restriction to the community of nationals (in contrast 
with voting rights in EP and local elections) reinforces a fundamentally non­
communitarian understanding of EU citizenship. It is on these grounds that, 
some 20 years ago, Raymond Aron argued that multinational citizenship was 
impossible. For him, the development of a fully-fledged status of rights attached 
to the notion of citizenship would not be possible if disconnected from a 
sovereign nation (Aron 1974). The development of a supranational status of 
rights has proved him wrong to some extent; but what remains to be seen is 
whether certain rights which are central to national understandings of social 
contract can be developed at the supranational level on the basis of an implicitly 
liberal model. And, here, Aron would appear to be right.
It has been argued above that the extension of citizenship rights has depended 
on redefining national assumptions and perceptions of citizenship. Indeed, the 
prospects for a ‘new’ social contract are pre-determined by this. The prevalence 
of negative integration in the EU (which, in its original economic formulation, 
refers to the removal of national restraints on trade and distortions of 
competition) (Tinbergen 1965: 76) means that the only foreseeable contract will, 
in any case, have a very liberal profile. The move towards a richer contract in 
terms of social rights at the EU level is made difficult because the process 
whereby it would have to be achieved - positive integration (the creation of new 
social and political institutions and instruments : order to shape the operating 
conditions of the internal market) - would need to embrace a degree of 
communitarianism which would be incompatible with the current direction taken 
by the EU.
Creating Citizenship through Negative Integration: The Principle of 
Equality in a Formal Dimension
The legal status of citizenship serves the primary purpose of establishing equality 
among individuals; citizenship serves to overcome inequalities created by 
cleavages such as sex, age and beliefs. Within the framework of the EU, these 
cleavages (sex, race, age etc.) are redressed by the catalogue of rights included 
in national citizenships and/or in constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights, 
which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has incorporated as principles of EC 
law. Therefore, the only meaningful cleavage which justifies the existence of EU 
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context of EU citizenship, equality has to be understood as equality among 
nationalities.
Under EC law, the principle of equality is incorporated into the principle of non­
discrimination on the grounds of nationality.2 Surprisingly, in formal terms, 
citizenship of the Union is not explicitly grounded in the principle of non­
discrimination operating in other areas of Community law. It could be argued 
that, in practical terms, ECJ judicial activism renders this unnecessary, since a 
generalized right to equality of treatment of Community citizens can be deduced 
from it (Lenaerts 1991: 25-32). The prohibition of non-discrimination, as 
developed by the ECJ case law, covers three situations: all direct or overt 
discrimination (rules which specifically provide for a different treatment of non­
nationals); indirect or disguised discrimination (rules which, although based on 
a criterion which appears to be neutral in practice, lead to discrimination3); 
reverse discrimination which occurs in situations where a Member State 
discriminates against its own citizens in favour of foreign nationals.
The limitations on constructing a general principle of equality through negative 
integration can be summarized in three points which presuppose a certain model 
of contract. Firstly, despite its progressive and flexible interpretation, as 
manifested in the Cowan case,4 the ECJ finds a constitutional limit to the 
prohibition of non-discrimination because of the lack of a precise base of a 
general character: non-discrimination is applied only within the scope of the EC 
Treaty. Therefore, an individual claiming equal treatment must establish that 
he/she is in an area covered by the Treaty (Schockweiler 1991: 16); and this 
undermines the general character which the principle of equality among citizens 
should have. The absence of a provision on non-discrimination on the grounds 
of nationality as one of the elements of EU citizenship of the union derives from 
the interpretation that the Treaty framers had of it: in other words, that it should 
regulate the functioning of the EC Treaty, particularly its economic dimension, 
rather than being part of the personal status of individuals. This questions the 
apparent inspiration behind EU citizenship: severing the link between economic 
activity and rights within the EU (Closa 1995: 494).
Secondly, since EU citizenship relies on Member States nationality, the 
completion of negative integration would have to advance logically towards the 
creation of a legal regime which removes the inequalities among EU citizens 
created by conditions to acquire nationality in each Member State. This raises 
two interlinked questions. On the one hand, Member States still remain 
gatekeepers for national citizenship privileges (whatever they are) via nationality 
laws. The heterogeneity of regimes puts EU citizens in unequal positions 




























































































Carlos d o sa
introduction of some harmonization measures seems to be possible, more 
comprehensive (and radical) solutions, such as multiple or dual citizenship 
appear to lack legitimacy. Furthermore, EU citizens may be in a situation of 
inequality vis-a-vis third country nationals: some Member States soften 
naturalization requirements with countries or group of countries with which 
particular solidarity links are assumed; and only Italy has reacted to the creation 
of a EU citizenship by softening naturalization requirements for nationals from 
EU States. On the other hand, would-be EU citizens are faced with different 
requirements for gaining access to EU citizenship because of divergent national 
legislation. In the opinion of Evans, a general extension of the equality principle 
would require a reduction of the exclusivity of nationality as a condition for 
access to equality and to allow for the operation of alternative conditions, 
notably that of residence (Evans 1995: 110).
vfhirdly, there are explicit Treaty derogations to the application of this principle 
which seek to preserve the inner core of the communitarian perception of 
national citizenship from the logic of the market. Thus, the principle is not 
applicable to those situations where nationality is a prerequisite for the exercise 
of certain rights or functions from which Member States may legitimately 
exclude Union citizens other than their own. These are the situations covered in 
particular by Articles 48 (4) and 55 of the EC Treaty. The Court has repeatedly 
confirmed that certain functions with the objective of safeguarding State’s 
general interest imply the existence of a particular relationship of solidarity with 
the State, as well as the reciprocity of rights and duties which are the foundation 
of nationality.5 The TEU has not modified this situation and the aforementioned 
articles remain unchanged. Any change derived from the qualitatively different 
nature of the Citizenship of the Union will, therefore, have to be brought about 
by ECJ case law, and, in this respect, some authors argue optimistically that it 
seems reasonable to expect that the Court will further narrow the scope of 
articles 48 (4) and 55 now that the provisions on citizenship have given a clear 
political dimension to the EC Treaty (Wouters 1994: 49).
These objection notwithstanding, it may be asked whether advances in the field 
of negative integration (which establish some basis for a liberal form of social 
contract) provide any margin for the reconstruction of the welfare dimension of 
social contractualism.
Substantial Social Entitlements: the Case for EU Social Rights
Normative as well as theoretical arguments suggest alternatively the desirability 
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in other words, the development of social rights that would influence the 
allocation functions of the market. From the normative point of view, it is 
evident that the market-led logic behind the European integration process is 
bound to deepen existing, or even worse, create new intra-societal inequalities. 
Social rights have the function of removing the (material) inequalities among 
individuals created by the market. Therefore, the possible impact of the single 
market on citizens’ material status - for instance, an increase in unemployment 
(Cinneide 1994), might justify the development of redistributive EU social 
rights. Moreover, if the question of inequality is raised in the framework of the 
EU, a new horizontal dimension appears: as the result of the functioning of the 
internal market, individuals and groups of individuals may see inequalities within 
the EU -and even within their own communities - grow larger. Winners and 
losers are identified along national lines and not as individuals. Put bluntly, the 
backwardness of the Southern Member States, either in terms of comparatively 
underdeveloped forms of social citizenship (Garcia 1993: 21-22) or unequal 
access to economic activity (Magone 1994), erodes the basic equality of 
citizenship in material terms, while, at the same time, the constraints on fiscal 
policy created by convergence programmes makes it harder for certain Member 
States to provide social rights at the highest EU standards. It can therefore be 
argued that if the process of Europeanization is itself creating additional 
disparities, then there are clears ground for seeking a remedy to this problem at 
the EU level (Kleinman and Piachaud 1993). This argument underpins the 
principle of economic and social cohesion which, as understood by some of its 
most authoritative interpreters, refers to the status of individuals: in other words, 
it is a political concept that establishes the maximum socially acceptable 
divergence among citizens of the Union (Elorza Cavengt 1992). The underlying 
thinking is that responsibility for the reduction of economic disparities has to be 
assumed by the Union as a prerequisite of its legitimacy.
Part of this normative argument underlies the more general theoretical analysis 
of rights. In a continuing debate with Marshall, the sociological tradition has 
linked the process of rights acquisition with the development of the market. If 
civic and political rights were the logical correlate of individual equality created 
by the market, social rights - and specifically redistributive rights - were created 
as an instrument for modifying the logic of the market. There seems little doubt 
that the market is central to the development of citizenship rights within the EC, 
which justifies the definition of such rights as ‘market citizenship; (Marias 1994) 
or ‘functionalist’ or ‘segmented’ citizenship (Neunreither 1995). The most highly 
developed rights - the freedom of movement and residence -are closely linked 
to the creation of the single market; indeed, they guarantee its efficiency and this 
secures a wide consensus for such rights. Following the sociological logic, some 





























































































Maastricht Treaty, argue that European citizenship is a possible case of reverse 
citizenship formation (inverting, that is, the order in which these rights are 
acquired)(Meehan 1993). In formal terms, Article 8e of the Treaty provides legal 
grounds for the development of social rights explicitly linked to the citizenship 
of the Union even without the necessity of a constitutional revision.
Thus, it seems that a case for EU social rights can be constructed on both 
theoretical and normative grounds. However, EU citizenship does not explicitly 
provide specific entitlements for the removal of inequalities provoked by the 
Union itself, and this creates a certain inconsistency in the legal construction. 
Certainly, it is increasingly becoming common opinion that EU citizenship rights 
should not be limited simply to those referred to as such by the Treaty (La Torre 
1995: 117; O’Leary 1995). In fact, a number of entitlements that can be 
interpreted as social rights - for instance, the entitlement to receive social 
benefits - may be identified in EC law. However, since they have not been 
expressly formulated as citizenship rights, their legitimacy (raison d ’etre) is 
grounded in the economic activity of individuals. They lack, therefore, the 
universal character of other citizenship rights. Entitlement to social benefits still 
varies according to the role played by the claimant in the process of Community 
economic integration, be it as a worker, a dependant, or an economically 
inactive individual (O’Leary 1995). The fact that certain social rights (mainly 
linked to labour market participation) have been explicitly included in the Social 
Protocol and Agreement - an annex to the TEU based on an intergovernmental 
agreement that is not strictly subject to EC law and LCJ jurisdiction - does little 
to improve this state of affairs. As has been con ctiy noted, the Social Charter 
and Action programme that preceded it were nut concerned with social rights for 
citizens but with fundamental social rights for workers (Kleinman and Piachaud 
1993); and this remains the case under the Protocol (see Introduction).
The difficulties in constructing EU social rights as part of EU citizenship are due 
to their specific nature. The classical Marshallian distinction merely contrasts 
them to political and civic rights but it fails to capture more subtle questions. 
One solution to this is to modify the Marshallian distinction between civil, 
political and social rights. Ferrajoli (1994) has proposed a different taxonomy 
of rights, combining two different criteria. The first is the logical structure of 
rights. According to this criteria, I propose a categorization of social rights as 
follows: rights to personal autonomy (for instance, right to family reunification 
following right of establishment); secondly, entitlements can be redefined as 
rights of personal autonomy (for instance, the rights to education or work may 
be understood as guarantee of non-intervention or as an active obligation of the 
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entitlements formulated as social objectives. The second criterion proposed by 
Ferrajoli is to identify the status of the recipient of rights, distinguishing 
fundamental (attached to legal personality) and citizenship rights.
The importance of both criteria derives from the fact that, in combination, they 
produce a new conception of rights in practice where social rights are not linked 
to the status of citizenship. The extension of social rights to ‘denizens’, for 
example, has been premised on a socioeconomic situation that has permitted two 
successive processes: firstly, the transformation of ‘expectation rights’ into 
effective entitlements. What permits social rights - understood as a social 
objectives - to become ‘effective entitlements’ is the presence of a certain level 
of socioeconomic development linked to a political programme. Secondly, given 
the contemporary normative self-understanding of the nation-state as an area for 
effective solidarity, these entitlements have been extended to non-citizens. At 
this point, the essential element in deciding entitlement is the existence of 
boundaries which distinguish between members and non-members of the 
community (Freeman 1986; Kleinman and Piachaud 1993). However, the 
boundaries are not traced between citizens (nationals) and non-citizens (non­
nationals) but they separate those ‘within city walls’ (Faist 1994: 7) from 
outsiders. The principle of redistributive justice is applied not only to fellow 
nationals but to any person within the boundaries of the community.
There are several obstacles to a similar development at the EU level. Firstly, the 
lack of commonality across the EU presents a problem of identification. Apart 
from a vague agreement on basic human rights, EU Member States present a 
heterogeneous regime of fundamental rights. There are differences in the way 
different societies attach social rights to the concept of citizenship or even in 
their tendency towards to add or detract from theme. The frameworks for 
creating or eliminating social rights are still very much national cultures and, 
specifically, the degree to which economic welfare in each Member State allows 
for the material provision which underpins them.
The lack of commonality is obstructed by the lack of channels for the 
formulation of new values. Whilst social conflict has often characterized the 
development of systems of rights, the behaviour of social actors has not led to 
a similar development at the EU level. Rather, the EU has become an additional 
arena for defending privileged national forms of citizenship on the eve of 
enhanced market competition (Breuer et al. 1994). This is related to the still 
primarily national character of the social actors and, for instance, the interest of 
certain ‘clubs’ (such as German trade unions) has been essential for the 





























































































Alternatively, the activism of the ECJ has been decisive, for instance, in 
enshrining certain rights in the EU’s constitution. But those commentators who 
have enthusiastically championed ECJ judicial activism in the area of social 
rights seem to ignore that while rights of personal autonomy in the social field 
may be judicially guaranteed, social entitlements require policy to be 
implemented. Some social rights (and certainly those with a redistributive 
content), conform to a type of ‘expectation rights’ that presupposes government 
action. In the absence of EU policies, social rights judicially guaranteed might 
constrain national governments to follow policies which imply substantial 
financial commitments. Therefore, Member States may be willing to resist 
moves in such direction.
A second, related, question refers to the obstacles for operationalizing social 
rights. In policy terms, social entitlements can be justified through political 
programmes based on efficiency, equality or solidarity arguments (Kleinman and 
Piachaud 1993). What is important, though, is that the kind of social rights 
inspired by each of these principles is different. Whilst certain social rights can 
be satisfied through what Majone calls ‘social regulation’ (ie. intervention whose 
purpose is to solve problems created by specific types of market failure), 
substantial provisions necessarily require the development of social policy, based 
on moral or political reasons (and not in the search for market efficiency) 
(Majone 1993:157). In practical terms, the lack of an EU-wide macro-economic 
policy, let alone budgetary or fiscal resources to alter the effects of the single 
market, limit the possible development of ‘social entitlements’ provided for by 
the EU (not to mention the kind of transnational social policy predicated by De 
Swaan) (de Swaan 1994).
The prevalence of efficiency considerations in the emergence of social 
entitlements at the European level seems to be clear. The policy logic behind 
European social standards is based on fears of ‘social dumping’ and, following 
an old opinion by Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamtothe, aims to assist the 
establishment of a system by ensuring that competition is not distorted in the 
framework of the Common Market.6 The objective of social policy as embedded 
in the Rome Treaty was not the correction of market outcomes in line with 
political ideas of social justice, but rather enabling the European labour market 
to function efficiently (Streeck 1995: 40). The principle of equality, on the other 
hand, seems to play a role in alleviating horizontal inequality (between Member 
States and their regions), particularly throughout its development of regional and 
cohesion policies. However, the equalizing concept which underlies the principle 
of social and economic cohesion is not the provision of individual rights in the 
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erode competitiveness) but rather interregional redistribution (Leibfried and 
Pierson 1992: 346). Moreover, the strategic interpretation of cohesion by some 
beneficiary governments has moved the locus of interpretation of this principle 
to a higher level, in an effort to restrict the number of participating countries as 
well as the possible role for regions (Closa 1995b).
Finally, solidarity is frequently invoked in EU rhetoric. In fact, Article A §3 of 
the TEU states that (the Union) task shall be to organize, in a manner 
demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States 
and between their peoples. However, policies promoting solidarity are not listed 
as Union objectives in Article B. These are the objectives for whose fulfilment 
the provision of adequate resources is foreseen by Article F(3). The conclusion, 
therefore, is that the promotion of solidarity, although a declarative principle, is 
not an objective for EU policies. This line of reasoning has been taken a step 
further by the German constitutional court. The Court has ruled that the 
development of policy to achieve this objective is beyond the reach of current 
Treaty provisions and, therefore, the Union cannot provide itself with the 
financial means and other resources that it might consider necessary for the 
fulfilment of its objectives. Following its line of interpreting the Member States 
as the Masters of the Treaty, the Court argues that Article F(3) merely makes 
a statement of intent to the effect that the Member States wish to provide it with 
adequate resources under whichever particular procedure is necessary.7 The 
interpretation that might be drawn from this ruling is that the creation of rights 
according to a logic of solidarity is not perceived as implicit in the nature of the 
Union.
^Citizenship and solidarity are truly interrelated and address similar concerns 
when citizenship is understood as an institution for the development of social 
bonds and the obligation of each person towards society. In this context, welfare 
provision is produced through a process of social cohesion while also producing 
greater cohesion through the establishment of a particular set of relationships 
(Spicker 1991). Although some authors have argued that the development of a 
Union social policy (and, specifically, redistributive rights) can help to produce 
greater solidarity (Cinneide 1994) and, in this sense, to create a community, it 
seems, in fact, that solidarity is rather a prerequisite for developing redistributive 
social rights. While they underpin and structure systems of solidarity, 
redistributive rights also seem to be part of a community’s self-perception and 
identity (Preuss 1991). The delicate value judgements about the appropriate 
balance of efficiency and equity, which social policy expresses, can only be 
made legitimately and efficiently within homogeneous communities (Majone 





























































































Europe was promoted by a relatively strong perception of a common (mostly 
male-constructed) citizenship, moulded by identity-shaping experiences such as 
wars and grounded in an underlying social homogeneity (Leibffied and Pierson 
1992). Redistributive social rights (and a hypothetical ‘state of revenue sharing’) 
would imply parallel duties (ie. taxes directly raised from citizens) (Leibfried 
1994: 15), accepted either as part of Union citizenship or as a non-discretional 
duty of Member State nationality. Whatever option, the grounds for such 
developments seem, at present, to be non-existent.
Alternatives to EU Citizenship as a Framework for Social Contract
Despite the sceptical argument presented above, EU citizenship remains the most 
meaningful basis for reconstructing a social contract at the EU level. If by 
citizenship is meant merely a commitment to the shared values of the Union as 
expressed in its constituent documents - ie., a commitment to the duties and 
rights of a civic society covering discrete areas of public life (Weiler 1995) - 
then the concept of EU citizenship is, of course, unnecessary. These 
commitments are already implicit in the acceptance of EC law which is directly 
applicable for nationals. Rather, the value of EU citizenship depends on its 
ability to protect individuals, via legal status, against the challenges that the EU 
legal order poses to values incorporated in national concepts of citizenship and 
contract, such as solidarity, cohesion and redistribution.
Critical commentaries on the implications of Union citizenship, however, warn 
against the exclusionist character which is intrinsic to the notion of citizenship 
itself (d’Oliveira 1995: 77-82), claiming even that the European integration 
process poses a challenge to the established distinction between fundamental 
rights of general availability and fundamental rights available to individuals in 
relation to nationality (Evans 1995: 104). This objection seems to be based on 
a mechanistic identification of national citizenship with EU citizenship and 
misses a fundamental difference between the two: the gatekeeper of citizenship 
privileges is nationhood (and its legal repository, nationality). No European 
nationality matches European citizenship and, therefore, whatever entitlements 
are included under European citizenship, Member States retain full discretion in 
determining who their nationals are even for the purposes of EC law. Therefore, 
regarding EU citizenship as a new banner for privilege is untenable, as long as 
it depends on nationality, the real banner for citizenship privileges.
A priori, there is no reason why Member States should not generalize EU 




























































































EU Citizenship as the Institutional Basis o f  a New Social Contract: Some Sceptical Remarks
A more subtle line of reasoning seeks to subsume the question of EU citizenship 
rights under the broader question of human rights. In short, it is assumed that 
individual rights are better served through fundamental rights, and that human 
rights are a superior normative entitlement. In this argument, the juridical 
analysis reacts to the sociological tradition which, from Marshall onwards, has 
referred the whole ensemble of rights (civil, political, social and others) to the 
status of citizenship. Although the evidence of the process of rights acquisition 
justifies sociological postulates, the latter identify citizenship, in reductionist 
fashion, as the main and almost only channel for individual entitlements to 
rights. From a juridical point of view, the concept of legal personality offers an 
alternative status for entitlement to fundamental rights (Ferrajoli: 1993), in which 
all civil rights and some social rights are included. State practice confirms that 
these are granted to all individuals within the boundaries of a political 
community.
The normative case for incorporating human rights and fundamental freedoms 
within the EU Treaty is undisputable, as is the case for generalizing social and 
civil rights to all individuals regardless their citizenship status. But the strength 
of the normative case is somehow weakened by two possible obstacles to its 
practical development.
Firstly, human rights are a normative category with no self-evident, precise, 
practical manifestation. Each constitutional order institutionalizes human rights 
by providing specific contents for fundamental rights listed in declarations and 
conventions (Bellamy: 1994). Since differences on the understanding of basic 
human rights are not uncommon among Member States, the creation of 
fundamental rights at the EU level through a political process of creating 
common standards would be essentially similar to the process of developing EU 
citizenship. The conceptual disagreements would be purely nominal; but the 
obstacles identified above would still be a problem, regarding either fundamental 
or citizenship rights.
Secondly, this line of argument seems to be unaware of an underlying value- 
option. This is because the objective is, specifically, the improvement of 
individual judicial protection vis-a-vis community law, particularly in face of the 
ECJ tendency to balance this protection (provided that the substance of the right 
is not altered) against Community’s objectives. A practical remedy to possible 
ECJ ‘excesses’ is posed by national constitutional courts, as the German Court 
has reminded it in its Maastricht Ruling. Another possible remedy would be an 
explicit, enforceable and general Treaty provision on the respect of human 





























































































of EU citizenship (whatever its limits) by the institutionalization of human rights 
would certainly confirm the ECJ as the main actor in the creation of rights and, 
incidentally, would also open the way to a notion of social contract which is 
based on negative rights, judicially secured - in essence, a liberal version of the 
social contract. It would be liberal in a double sense: first, citizenship status 
would result from market interaction (negative integration and efficiency- 
oriented social rights) although with a universally high level of protection (the 
one set by human rights). Second, and in contrast, rights (either political or 
social) aimed at correcting the functioning of the market would have to be 
explicitly introduced through political decision. Redistributive rights - which 
may be ‘inefficient’ from a market perspective -have as their only possible 
justification the democratic will of the citizens (Streeck 1995: 35). Therefore, 
these rights would appear to require the democratic political process as a 
prerequisite. In this case, though, it would be necessary to overcome the 
widespread belief that rights associated with various manifestations of that ‘over­
arching evil’ in EU politics - the European super-state - are illegitimate.
Conclusion
xThe prospects for reconstructing the social content of contemporary European 
national contracts at the EU level seem to be slim. A market-based form of EU 
social contract has begun to emerge; but national identities still pose a 
formidable obstacle to its full development. While using EU citizenship as a 
means for developing a richer form of social contract are normatively well 
grounded, it is difficult to put into practice. Alternatives to EU citizenship, 
however, do rely on the partial liberal contract described above. In this context, 
the development of a European public sphere in which notions of public good 
can be discussed and identified, becomes a prerequisite for the 
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